This paper, presenting a wide range of issues related to the role of Turkey in the Mediterranean energy context, aims to provide a comprehensive framework of understanding of the growing strategic relevance of Turkey for both the European Union and the overall Euro-Mediterranean region. In particular, the paper focuses on the EU-Turkey energy relations and outlines the crucial role of natural gas in enhancing energy cooperation between the two players. In 2010 about 80% of EU gas imports derived from only three suppliers: Russian
Introduction "The Mediterranean is not a tool, but a fate", the French historian Ferdinand Braudel once wrote. It is from this statement, from the belief that the Mediterranean represents the common future of the peoples living along its shores, which originated the idea of this paper. Adopting the Functionalist theory to International Relations, which aims at integrating individual sectors in hopes of achieving spillover effects to further increase a process of regional integration, this paper argues that energy could be the best tool to strengthen the economic, political and social integration of the Mediterranean region.
A number of geopolitical and macroeconomic factors indicate that, in addition to the European Union, another player will be crucial for the strengthening of the Mediterranean integration process: The Republic of Turkey. This country, which has always been the major economy among Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs), has further strengthened its regional economic preeminence during the 2000s and it is set to represent almost half of the entire SEMCs' economic outlook by 2016. Furthermore, with the Arab Spring the established geopolitical equilibrium of SEMCs has expired, generating in the area a situation of great uncertainty that opens new opportunities for Turkey to (re)emerge as the leading regional power. The Arab spring has come at a time when Turkey was already in the process of establishing its position in the regional chessboard. Over the last decade the country has articulated a vision for improving relations with all its neighbors, renewing its aspirations in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iraq, Iran and in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The major role of Turkey among SEMCs is not only due to the size of its economy and the weight of its foreign policy, but also to its unique position in terms of energy. The country is placed at the centre of 68% of world's oil reserves and 75% of world's natural gas reserves; a feature that opens a number of opportunities for Turkey in terms of energy transit. The most important opportunity for the country seems to be related to natural gas. Both the prospects for European gas demand and for gas production in countries surrounding Turkey allow a bright future for Turkey as a natural gas hub at the Mediterranean energy crossroads.
The European Union should be attentive to this prospect, as natural gas will continue to play an important and increasing role in the European energy mix for coming decades. The European Commission has recently stated in its Energy Roadmap 2050 that natural gas will be critical for the transformation of the energy system, foreseeing that mediumterm European gas demand will stay high, especially in the power generation sector. In 2010, about 80% of EU gas imports derived from only three suppliers: Russian Federation, Norway and Algeria. This heavy dependence on such a few suppliers stimulated the European Commission to make the concept of diversification a cornerstone of its energy policy. This concept has been interpreted on its broader definition, including both diversification of suppliers and diversification of transit countries, because of the strong geopolitical issues related to gas infrastructure. In particular, the European Commission has formally launched in 2008 the concept of the Southern Gas Corridor, an initiative aimed to develop a natural gas transit from Caspian and Middle Eastern gas-rich regions to Europe, in order to ease the dependency on the natural gas imported from the Russian Federation. This natural gas corridor is currently being designed, as there are a number of different infrastructure projects on the table. However, even if these various pipeline projects differ on their path, transit throughout Turkey will be necessary. Whoever the winning-project of the race for a Southern gas corridor, it is certain that it will contribute to the shift of the "center of gravity" of the regional gas transit from the north to the south of the Black Sea. It will allow Turkey to become a key transit country in the future European gas market: a pivotal element in the architecture for security of supply of European gas.
The potential role of Turkey as the regional natural gas hub is more relevant when considering that an important geological reassessment of the hydrocarbon reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean area is presently ongoing. The area is set to become a worldclass hydrocarbon province, consequently changing the geopolitical scenario of an area on which Turkey, also because of the still open question of Cyprus, is active and influential. Moreover, Turkey is the country better placed to deal with Iran and Iraq. Also if the political situation of these countries remains unclear, it is probable that over the next two decades Europe will be forced to turn to these countries to meet its natural gas import needs. If Brussels often seems to be focused almost exclusively on the issue of diversification from Russian gas supplies, there is another profound force that could potentially weaken the EU security of gas supply: Norway. The second gas supplier of the EU has always been reliable, but some concerns are emerging about its capability to deliver its gas supply in the long-term. According to different institutions, Norwegian gas production will peak in 2015-2020 and could then fall dramatically. In this scenario it would be necessary for the EU to look at the Caspian region, Iran and Iraq to meet its natural gas requirements. After years of under-exploitation, gas reserves of these countries would represent an enormous and unprecedented opportunity for European energy companies and for Turkey itself. It would see a further increase of its geostrategic importance as a regional natural gas hub. Considering the composition of Turkey's natural gas imports and the aforementioned prospects related to the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, it is clear that Turkey's relations with gas producing countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Iraq will be critical for the future energy security of the country and the future of the EU energy security. It is necessary to underline the enormous renewable energy potential (particularly solar) of SEMCs, to which Turkey could greatly contribute technology transfer and manufacturing know-how. Turkey's involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean, an institutional framework that strongly supports the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Desertec concept, offers another opportunity for energy cooperation within the Mediterranean region. In this sense, the European strategy for a Mediterranean energy ring linking Europe with the Southern Mediterranean through electricity and gas interconnections provides Turkey with a crucial role. A renewed cooperation scheme on natural gas and renewable energy between Turkey and the European Union could trigger a process of economic, political and social integration throughout the overall Mediterranean region. seems "to represent different things to different people" 5 , but mainly because the success of this model is based on a series of characteristics that belong to the sui generis nature of Turkey. These features concern the historical, political and religious background of Turkey, as well as its economic structure.
Turkey in the new
Considering the political aspects, it should be remarked that the democratic and secular character of the Republic of Turkey 6 is the result of a long and complex historical path originated in the turbulent period that followed the end of the First World War. After the humiliation of the armistice of Mudros 7 and the following partitioning of the Ottoman Empire among the Allies nations, Mustafa Kemal conducted an epic war of independence, which led to the establishment of a modern and secular state founded on the principles of democracy, progress and modernity. As underlined by Fiorani Piacentini (2005), Mustafa Kemal considered the process of secularization as the only possible way to legitimize the newborn Republic of Turkey abroad and to control the potentially explosive religious factor in such a complex moment of the national transition 8 .
The process of secularization -and the subsequent coexistence of a secular state and a Muslim population-has also been possible because of the unique character of Islam in Turkey, which represents a syncretism between the Islamic Law and a series of preexisting traditions derived from ancient Central Asian populations 9 . The vast majority of Muslims in Turkey are Sunni that follows the Hanafi School of jurisprudence, considered as the more liberal among the four Sunni Schools of legal thought. This School -which puts great emphasis on the role of reason-accepted the integration of official Islam with the pre-existing traditions, also allowing Turkey's Muslims to be more receptive to Western values (such as democracy) with respect to other forms of Islam. The strong complementarity between modernity and tradition, typical of Turkey, could be seen as a direct result of this unique religious and cultural heritage.
Concerning the economic structure of Turkey, it is necessary to highlight how the country's strong economic growth is based on highly productive and dynamic small and 5 Ülgen S. (2011) Sevrès (1920) e Losanna (1923) che la secolarizzazione delle istituzioni apparve ad Ataturk l'unico sentiero percorribile per ottenere legittimazione internazionale al neo-stato "turco" da un lato, e dall'altro conseguire quella coesione interna necessaria a strutturare un apparato che fosse impermeabile alle emotività di un "religioso" (islamico e non) in piena effervescenza e rinascita nazionalistica". medium enterprises (SMEs) 10 . This generates important consequences both for Turkey's domestic policy and its foreign policy. As Taşpınar (2011) underlined, "Anatolian bourgeoisie regularly votes for conservative parties and has a vested interest in political stability. Turkey's Muslim entrepreneurs dream about maximizing their sales and profits in the global marketplace instead of an Islamic revolution that will bring about Sharia" 11 . Considering that an important part of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) electorate is represented by the new middle-class composed by provincial artisans, traders and small and mid-range entrepreneurs 12 , it is possible to understand the incentive for the AKP to implement moderate domestic policies (to meet the need of internal stability) and a dynamic foreign policy (to meet the need of create new market opportunities) 13 .
This brief excursus through the main political, cultural and economic factors that define the Turkish model should suggest the impossibility of applying this model in its entirety to the new realities emerged in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean after the Arab Spring. For this reason -after the most tumultuous geopolitical storm that the Mediterranean has ever witnessed in its recent history-Turkey should be considered as the main political laboratory of the region, rather than a monolithic model. Turkey is a political laboratory that could offer a wide range of ideas and suggestions to the new Southern Mediterranean. This dynamic opens a number of opportunities for Turkey and also discloses a "sea of opportunities" between the two shores of the Mediterranean, notably starting in the field of energy. For this reason, Turkey should be placed at the centre of any reflection about the future of the Southern Mediterranean and the prospects for an enhanced Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.
Macroeconomic profile of SEMCs and the place of Turkey
Over the last decade SEMCs have experienced a rapid economic expansion, growing with an average growth rate of 4,5% from a overall GDP level of 557 US$ billions in 2000 to 1.573 US$ billions in 2010 14 . Turkey has always been the major economy of the region and during the 2000s it has further strengthened its regional economic preeminence. According to the latest IMF official forecasts over the next years Turkey will remain among the most dynamic economies in the region, increasing its GDP from 691 US$ billions in 2010 to 1.200 US$ billions in 2017. During the last decade, SEMCs have grown not just in terms of GDP but also in terms of population. In fact, the population of the region has grown from 234 million people in 2000 to 277 million people in 2011 15 . Egypt and Turkey are the two most populous countries in the region and together they account for more than a half of the overall regional population. According to IMF forecasts, SEMCs overall population will continue to grow also in the near future, to reach 297 million people in 2016. 15 
Ibidem
Considering the various levels of GDP per capita among SEMCs it is possible to denote how Israel, Turkey and Lebanon present higher levels (in the case of Israel much higher) with respect to other countries in the region. According to IMF forecasts, over the period 2011-2016 Turkey's GDP per capita will grow with a CAGR of 7%, well above the regional average of 5%. These three fundamental macroeconomic indicators -GDP, population and GDP per capita-exemplify the key position of Turkey in the regional economic landscape and represent an important element in order to understand the crucial role that the country plays -and will continue to play-in the Mediterranean region.
Turkey: an energy hub in the Mediterranean energy crossroads?
The rapid economic and demographic expansion forecasted for SEMCs will certainly have a substantial effect on the regional energy outlook. According to the MedPro Energy Reference scenario 16 SEMCs energy consumption will almost double over the next two decades, growing from 311 Mtoe in 2010 to about 600 Mtoe in 2030. Turkey has more than doubled its energy consumption between 1990 (47 Mtoe) and 2010 (110 Mtoe), becoming the first energy consumer country of the Southern Mediterranean (in 2010 Turkey represented the 31% of the overall regional energy consumption). As the country will likely see the fastest medium-to long-term economic expansion in the region, this share is set to increase steadily over the next two decades, to reach a level of 38% in 2030.
In 2010 Turkey's primary energy mix was: natural gas (35 Mtoe), coal (34 Mtoe), oil (29 Mtoe), hydro (12 Mtoe) and other renewables (1 Mtoe) 17 . The country does not own significant oil and gas reserves 18 , and it consequently imports 90% of its oil and 98% of its natural gas requirements. Because of this high level of energy dependency, security of supply is the government's main energy policy objective and for this reason Turkey has developed over the last years a broad framework of energy diplomacy with oil and gas producing countries in the region. The major role of Turkey in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean energy landscape is not only due to its market size but also to its unique geographic position. In fact, Turkey is placed at the centre of 68% of world's oil reserves and 75% of world's natural gas reserves 19 . This unique feature opens a number of opportunities to Turkey in terms of energy transit. In particular, the most important opportunity for the country seems to be related to natural gas. Both the prospects for the European gas demand and for gas production in supplier countries surrounding Turkey allow a bright future to be foreseen for Turkey as the regional natural gas hub. 
Turkey: a key transit country in the future European gas market
The long-term outlook for EU gas demand is characterized by two elements of uncertainty. The first is linked to the role of natural gas in the long-term European energy mix, and the second is related to the ambiguities about the EU gas production prospects (i.e. depletion of gas reserves in the UK, shale gas developments in Poland).
19 See Annex -Oil and gas reserves around Turkey.
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Oil: 46 bbl Gas 12,7 tcm Notwithstanding this general long-term uncertainty, natural gas could well continue to play an important -and increasing-role in the European energy mix for some decades. The European Commission has recently stated on its Energy Roadmap 2050 20 that natural gas will be critical for the transformation of the energy system, foreseeing that medium-term European gas demand will stay high, especially in the power generation sector. Compared to other fossil fuels, natural gas is set to perform much better and it is expected to keep its 2005 share in primary energy consumption up to 2050 approximately constant in all decarbonisation scenarios. Source: European Commission While natural gas was the "fuel of choice" over the last two decades, it could become the "fuel of consequence" during the next two decades. With other alternatives all facing problems of their own (i.e. the nuclear renaissance, a very strong penetration of intermittent renewable energy sources, coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS)), it could well be that gas turns out to be the winner for some time to come, thus realizing the "golden age of gas" 21 recently predicted by the International Energy Agency 22 .
Middle East
In 2010 about 80% of EU gas imports (330 bcm) derived from only three suppliers: Russian Federation (110 bcm), Norway (99 bcm) and Algeria (50 bcm) 23 . This heavy dependence on a few suppliers stimulated the European Commission to make the concept of diversification a cornerstone of its energy policy. This concept has been interpreted on its broader definition, including both diversification of suppliers and (because of the strong geopolitical issues related to gas infrastructure) diversification of transit countries. In particular, the European Commission has formally launched in 2008 24 the concept of the Southern Gas Corridor 25 , an initiative aimed to develop a natural gas transit from Caspian and Middle Eastern gas-rich regions to Europe, in order to ease the dependency on the natural gas imported from the Russian Federation.
The Caspian region is endowed with a considerable amount of proven gas reserves. In 2010 Turkmenistan held 8 tcm of proven gas reserves, followed by Kazakhstan (1.8 tcm), Uzbekistan (1.6 tcm) and Azerbaijan (1.3 tcm) 26 . However, the export potential of these countries is hindered by their landlocked geographical situation and by the fact that their gas system had been created under the Soviet era to supply Russia. As a result, being dependent on the Russian Federation for their gas exports to Europe, these countries would need either to have access to the Russian gas system under fair Third Parties Access (TPA) conditions, or to develop alternative routes such as a pipeline across the Caspian Sea. However, any pipeline under the Caspian is a delicate operation and considering its many technical and legal problems, to date it has not been possible to reach a full consensus on its feasibility 27 .
Both Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have expressed several times in the recent past the availability of substantial gas volumes and a clear willingness to sell it to Europe. Over the last months, the EU has engaged in a regular dialogue with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which figure among the key potential gas suppliers of the "Southern Energy Corridor" 28 . In this sense, the mandate accorded on September 12, 2011 , by all 21 IEA (2011), "Are we entering a golden age of gas?", Special report, Paris. 22 According to the International Energy Agency, European natural gas demand will increase by 24% between 2009 and 2035, largely because of the power generation sector, the industry sector and the housing sector. The share of natural gas in the EU primary energy mix will thus increase from 25% in 2009 to 30% in 2035. However, in the case of the EU the fulfillment of the "golden age of gas" prophecy will mainly depend on the availability of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies at large scale and to the signals that the EU will provide on future gas demand. For a broad discussion on the prospects of EU gas demand refer to: Tagliapietra S., Hafner M., Glachant J.M, De Jong J., Ahner N. (2012) While gas supplies from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan (and eventually Iran and Iraq) could be consider as a long-term prospect for the Southern Gas Corridor, gas supplies from Azerbaijan are much more realistic and feasible in the medium-term. The core gas reserves of the country are located in Shah Deniz, a massive natural gas field situated in the Southern part of the Caspian Sea. The field covers approximately 860 sq. kms and has proven gas reserves estimated to 1000 bcm 30 . The project of Shah Deniz 2 will include an additional offshore gas platform, sub sea wells and expansion to the gas plant at Sangachal Terminal. This project will add 16 bcm to the current gas production, to be exported mainly to Turkey (10 bcm) and to the EU (6 bcm). The political decision of linking Azerbaijan to Europe represents a constant position of the Azeri government but if the EU will not be able to seize this opportunity, the country will start considering alternative routes for its natural gas 31 .
With regards to the gas exports from the region to Europe, there are several projects on the table: (i) TAP; (ii) TANAP; (iii) Nabucco West; (iv) SEEP; (v) AGRI; (vi) White Stream. With the exception of White Stream (a submarine pipeline across the Black Sea linking Georgia-Romania-Ukraine) and AGRI (a concept of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania to build an LNG chain across the Black Sea) all these projects share a common feature: direct or indirect transit through Turkey. (i) The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is an 800 km-long gas pipeline designed to provide the missing link for gas transportation from Greece to Italy through Albania and the Adriatic Sea 32 . TAP would bring natural gas from the Shah Deniz field to the European market with an initial capacity of 10 bcm/year, expandable to 20 bcm/year. TAP is owned and actively supported by EGL of Switzerland with 42.5%, Statoil of Norway with 42.5% and E.ON Ruhrgas of Germany with 15%.
(ii) In December 2011, the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a Memorandum of Understanding to progress the construction of a new Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which would carry gas up from the eastern border of Turkey to the western border, likely Bulgaria or Greece with a capacity of 16 bcm/year. The project is currently shared by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) -which holds an 80% stake in the project-and the Turkish state company BOTAS 33 . Further companies could farm into the TANAP project during 2012, although SOCAR will retain operatorship. In fact, this pipeline would be important for the Azeri company, as it would have a role in the delivery of gas from its Shah Deniz field further down the supply chain to Europe, rather than selling at its border. Initial cost estimates for the pipeline are US$5 billion. Work has begun on the preparation of a feasibility study of the TANAP project. According to SOCAR, TANAP work is expected to begin by the autumn of 2012 34 .
(iii) Nabucco West is a proposed pipeline designed to bring Caspian gas from the Bulgarian-Turkish border to Baumgarten and beyond. Nabucco West is a modified concept of the Nabucco project. The concept foresees the construction of a 1.300 km pipeline that will run from the Bulgarian/Turkish border to the Central European gas hub 35 . The pipeline is designed to transport gas initially from Azerbaijan and is fully scalable to meet future gas transport demand from the Caspian Region and Middle-East to the European markets. Nabucco West has the advantage to benefit from the existing legal framework, namely the Intergovernmental Agreement, Project Support Agreements and third party access exemptions as the Nabucco base case and will follow exactly the same route on European Union territory 36 . The companies involved in the project are BOTAS (Turkey), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), Transgaz (Romania), MOL (Hungary), RWE Dea (Germany) and OMV (Austria).
(iv) British Petroleum proposed in September 2011 the South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP), a 3,800 km-long infrastructure from eastern Turkey to Austria that would use existing pipelines, but would also need 1.000 km of new pipeline to be laid in different countries 37 . Through this pipeline Azerbaijan would be able to supply Europe with 10 bcm/year of natural gas, mainly from Shah Deniz Phase II. As pointed out by Soltanov (2012) "the combined advantages of its size, scalability, usage of existing gas infrastructure in Europe and direction, promises a more reasonable economic and political value for the Shah Deniz consortium, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Europe, while posing a bearable challenge to Russia. The SEEP seems to offer a greater value to a greater number of actors" 38 .
The development of one pipeline project rather than another will primarily depend on the Shah Deniz Consortium's decision, expected for mid-2013 39 . However, even if these various pipeline projects differ on their path, the transit throughout Turkey will be necessary in any case. Whatever will be the winning-project of the Southern Gas Corridor race, it is thus certain that it will contribute to the shift of the "center of gravity" of the regional gas transit from the north to the south of the Black Sea, allowing Turkey to become a key transit country in the future European gas market: a pivotal element in the architecture of supply for European gas security.
The potential role of Turkey as regional natural gas hub seems to be even more relevant if considering that an important geological reassessment of the hydrocarbon reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean area is ongoing (from the Egyptian Mediterranean offshore to the Israeli Levantine basin). If expectations are confirmed the area could become a world-class hydrocarbon province, consequently changing the geopolitical scenario of a region on which Turkey, also because of the still open-question of Cyprus, is active and influential. Moreover, Turkey is the country better placed, both in terms of geography and politics, to deal with Iran and Iraq. Also if the geopolitical situation in these countries remains unclear, it is probable that over the next two decades Europe will be forced to turn to these countries to meet its natural gas import needs. Even if Brussels often seems to be focused only on the issue of diversification from Russian gas supplies, there is another profound force that could potentially weaken the EU security of gas supply: Norway.
The second gas supplier of the EU (99 bcm in 2010 40 ) has always been reliable, but some concerns are emerging about its capability to deliver its gas supply in the longterm. The country has not made a significant gas discovery since the discovery of the Ormen Langen field in 1997. According to different institutions, Norwegian gas production will peak in 2015-2020 and will then fall dramatically 41 . In this scenario it would be necessary for the EU to look at Iran (which owns the second largest gas reserves in the world) and Iraq (i.e. Iraqi Kurdistan) to meet its natural gas requirements. After years of under-exploitation, gas reserves of these countries would represent an enormous and unprecedented opportunity for European energy companies and for Turkey itself, given that it would see a further increase of its geostrategic importance as regional natural gas hub. Considering this perspective it is thus crucially important to analyze what are the relationships between Caspian and Middle Eastern gas producing countries and Turkey. 38 Soltanov E. (2012) 41 According to the Global Energy Systems Center of the University of Uppsala, Norwegian gas production will peak at a range of 124-135 bcm a year in 2015-2020 and will then fall dramatically. According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Norwegian gas production will peak around 2020. At that time, annual gas production is estimated at between 105 and 130 bcm a year, while the production level after 2020 will largely be determined by new discoveries.
Turkish relationships with gas producing countries
Turkey's natural gas consumption began in the 1980s, gradually grew in the 1990s and boomed during the 2000s. Throughout this last decade the country's natural gas consumption increased by 130% 42 , making Turkey one of the fastest growing natural gas markets in Europe. In 2010, natural gas was the main component of Turkey's energy mix, followed by coal, oil, hydro and other renewables 43 .
This increase in natural gas consumption, together with the fact that Turkey does not have a significant domestic natural gas production 44 , explains how much important natural gas is not only for the country's energy security but also for the safety and the sustainability of its economic development. This importance is likely to increase in the future, as the government has planned to greatly develop electricity production from natural gas. According to Wood Mackenzie (2011) 11 GW of new gas-fired power generation capacity will come online between 2011 and 2030 in the country 45 . Coming to the geographical distribution of Turkey's gas supplies, in 2010 the country imported major volumes of natural gas from the Russian Federation (16,6 bcm), Iran (7,8 bcm), Azerbaijan (4,3 bcm), Algeria (3,9 bcm), Qatar (1,9 bcm) and minor volumes from Nigeria, Egypt, Tobago, Norway and Belgium 46 . According to Wood Mackenzie (2011), over the next decades Turkey will increasingly rely on gas supplies from Iran and Azerbaijan, consequently decreasing its high dependence on Russian gas supplies. Considering the composition of Turkey's natural gas imports outlook and the aforementioned prospects related to the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, it is clear that Turkey's relations with gas producing countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Iraq will be critical not only for the future energy security of the country itself but also for the future of the EU security of gas supply.
(i) Turkish relationship with the Caucasus and Central Asia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union a great wave of enthusiasm flooded the Western world with regard to the potential of Turkey to serve as a model for the new independent republics emerged in the Caucasus and Central Asia (the so-called "Turkic world"). Turkey was among the first countries to recognize the independence of these newborn states, establishing diplomatic relations and providing economic support. However, Turkey failed to play the role of "model-country" and the vacuum in the region was thus mainly filled by the Russian Federation. This failure was mainly due to the economic and political problems that plagued Turkey in the early 1990s 47 and to the Turkish mistaken conviction that relations with the area could be maintained without much effort because of the historical and ethnic ties. In fact, it is unquestionable that Turkey has deep-rooted historical and cultural ties with Caucasus and Central Asian republics but as Kumova and Albavrak (2011) pointed out, "the first (Turkish) initiatives towards the region were mainly based on emotions. Turkey emerged as a protective elder brother, which caused drawbacks over the long-run when the role was too much to deliver" 48 . Nevertheless, over the last decade Turkey's role in the region is rapidly changed, embarking the country in a process of renewed centrality in the area. As Aras and Akpinar (2011) pointed out: "The pivotal points in this process point to the rise of the AK Party, the beginning of the EU membership process, the restructuring of civil-military relations, democratic reforms overcoming the focus on security and the search for new markets for rising foreign trade and economic growth" 49 . In particular, Turkey pioneered the process of "The Summits of Turkic Speaking Countries' Heads of States", which has been held since 1992 in order to increase solidarity between the Turkic Speaking Countries and create new cooperation opportunities among them. This process has acquired an institutional structure in 2009 with the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (CCTS) 50 . This organization seeks to consolidate mutual trust and confidence among its members, reinforcing political solidarity, improving economic cooperation and keeping a record of the history and cultural accumulation of the Turkic world. In particular, the organization seeks to 47 Until the 1980s Turkey was a closed economy with a strong interventionist economic model and starting with the 1990s Turkey experienced a boom-bust growth model which suffered from chronic macroeconomic instability. The liberalisation begun in the 1980s was not accompanied by sound macroeconomic policies or an adequate strengthening of the institutional and regulatory framework, in particular of the banking sector. As a result, the 1990s were marked by volatility which culminated in the 2000/2001 economic crisis. That crisis at last induced Turkey to revamp its political and democratic institutions and economic structures. For a more detailed discussion of this point refer to: Macovei M. 16 September 2010 . The Preamble of the Nakhcivan Agreement reaffirms the common will of its member States to adhere to the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and encapsulates the objective of CCTS as further deepening the comprehensive cooperation among Turkic speaking states, as well as making joint contributions to peace and stability in its region and the world. Cooperation under CCTS is based on the particular solidarity stemming from the unity of common history, culture, identity and language of Turkic speaking peoples. In particular, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan remains the strongest in the area, despite a short-term cooling caused by an Armenian-Turkish effort to normalize their bilateral relations, an idea strongly opposed by Azerbaijan 55 . Economic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are steadily growing, as regular mutual high-level visits continue 56 . In 2010 the total trade volume between the two countries reached US$ 2.4 billion, as Turkey exported to Azerbaijan US$ 1.5 billion of industrial goods and imported US$ 865 million of mining products, including oil and natural gas 57 . According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over 800 Turkish companies operate in Azerbaijan, mainly in the building sector. The two economies present complementary features and for this reason it is possible to consider economic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan as mutually beneficial and based on a win-win situation 58 . With regard to the field of energy, in mid 2001 BOTAS and Azerbaijan's state oil company SOCAR signed a deal for the supply of gas from the Shah Deniz field to Turkey. The contract was delayed to 2007 because of over-supply concerns. Gas flow to Turkey commenced through Georgia along the 670 km South Caucasus Pipeline (a 51 See the institutional website: http://www.turkkon.org/eng/ 52 According to Kanbolat (2011) , "Uzbekistan seems determined not to join in any organization where Turkic identity is emphasized. This attitude of non-participation is consistent with Uzbekistan's policy of isolation and alienation under President Islam Karimov". similar route to its oil counterpart, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) 59 and in 2010 Azerbaijan supplied Turkey with 4.3 bcm of natural gas 60 . In June 2010 the energy ministers of the two countries 61 signed three natural gas supply deals with which Turkey will import a volume of gas up to 12 bcm/year from the Shah Deniz field. The deal also set the terms for the transit of Azerbaijani gas to Europe and addressed price adjustments for the gas for Turkey 62 .
This deal with Azerbaijan put on hold the MoU signed in May 1999 between Turkey and Turkmenistan for the supply of 16 bcm/year to the Turkish domestic market and another 14 bcm/year to be transported to Europe. In the future, gas from Turkmenistan will likely flow through the South Caucasus Pipeline to the Turkish border, after which it would connect with other pipeline into Europe. Turkish companies are also very active in Turkmenistan. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about 600 Turkish companies are registered in Turkmenistan 63 .
(ii) Turkish relationship with Iran and Iraq
The Turkish relationship with Iran has historically been volatile and characterized by alternative phases of rivalry and cooperation. Over the last decades the dialectic between Iranian Islamism and Turkish secularism, the Kurdish question and the Turkish ties with the United States and Israel have had a negative impact on the relationship between the two countries. However, this relationship has undergone a considerable change with the new foreign policy embraced by Turkey since 2002. Over the last years the two countries have progressively put aside deep-rooted ideological differences, focusing on much more pragmatic economic and trade issues. On one side Turkey has a strong economic interest in Iran as it is its second supplier of natural gas and it represents a vast market for the export of Turkish manufactured goods 64 . On the other side, Iran has a strong economic interest on Turkey, as the country represents a huge market for its hydrocarbon exports and also because Iran is using the Turkish banking and finance industry to complete financial transactions for trade deals. When strong Western sanctions kick in against Iran's central bank, Iran wants to count on Turkish financial institutions in transactions with Iranian trading partners. In fact, according to the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), only in 2011 about 590 Iranian companies were established in Turkey. Moreover, sanction-hit Iranian banks line up to enter the Turkish financial market 65 . Over the last years the two countries have established a solid legal framework for their economic and trade relations, signing an agreement on reciprocal promotion and protection of investments, an agreement on avoidance of double taxation and an agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters. The overall Turkey-Iran trade volume reached a level of US$ 10,7 billion in 2010 66 .
Energy is the cornerstone of this relationship. Iranian natural gas and oil exports to Turkey amounted to US$ 7,6 billion in 2010. Iran, the second largest gas reserve holder in the world with 30 tcm of proven reserves 67 , signed a 22-year supply deal with Turkey in 1996, with first deliveries of 3 bcm/year from 1999 before reaching a plateau volume of 10 bcm/year in 2005 68 . Due to delays in constructing the required infrastructure in Turkey and the lack of distribution infrastructure in the east of the country, BOTAS was not ready to receive the gas before December 2001, when the 2.377 km-long pipeline from Tabriz in Iran to Ankara was completed. The pipeline has a capacity of 13 bcm, which the Iranian Government intends to increase to 22.6 bcm in 2016 and to 32.5 bcm by 2021 69 . However, gas import from Iran has not been reliable, as PKK militants have blown up the pipeline on several occasions 70 . Iran agreed to revise the contract to 3.5 bcm deliveries in 2001 rising to 10 bcm by 2007. The contract has been extended to cover 25 years and total volumes to be delivered under the contract have increased from 192 bcm to 228 bcm 71 . The supply agreement between Iran and Turkey is currently being blocked by ongoing negotiations over gas pricing 72 . However, as Kinnander (2010) pointed out: "Even though developing the gas relationship between Turkey and Iran faces many obstacles, Turkey seems very keen to pursue and finalise this contract. This can to a large extent be explained by the new Turkish zero-problem policy towards its neighbours and its desire to develop stronger relations with them" 73 . Furthermore, the United States continues to put pressure on the Turkish government to avoid dealing with Iran, as they believe it will undermine diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program. In fact, Turkey does not oppose the Iranian nuclear program, as it considersparaphrasing Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan-that "no one has the right to impose anything on anyone with regards to nuclear energy, provided that it is for peaceful purposes" 74 . This controversial point, together with the wider issue of US influence over the Turkish energy policy, remains an important element to take into consideration in the analysis of Turkish-Iranian gas relationship.
The Turkish relationship with Iraq is also increasing, as growing trade and energy ties are enhancing the interdependence between the two countries. Turkey is the largest commercial investor in Iraq, with more than 120 companies working in the country 75 . The trade volume between Turkey and Iraq reached a level of US$ 6 billion in 2010, up from US$ 940 million in 2003 76 . In particular, the flourishing Iraqi construction sector accounts for the lion's share of Turkey-Iraq trade volumes 77 . This sector is set to further grow in the future, as the reconstruction of Iraq will continue. Natural gas will likely play a key-role in the future relations between the two countries. On one hand, Iraqi gas is particularly important for Turkey, as it could be connected to the Turkish national network through a pipeline to be constructed parallel to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, consequently further diversifying Turkish natural gas suppliers. On the other hand, Turkey is crucial for Iraq, as any natural gas export from Iraq to Europe will necessarily transit via Turkey. In 1996 the first agreement was signed for the construction of an Iraq-Turkey natural gas pipeline, a project currently on hold. Moreover, in August 2007 Turkey and Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding in order to supply Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and via Turkey to Europe. Turkey's Energy Minister Taner Yildiz recently declared that "Turkey plans to build a power plant on the Iraqi border to sell electricity to Iraq in return of natural gas, and it is making important steps to import natural gas from Iraq" 78 .
Turkey is increasingly attracted by the natural gas reserves of Iraqi Kurdistan, as recent explorations have confirmed that between 2,8 and 5,6 tcm of natural gas reserves are located in the region. Once established, Kurdistan's gas reserves would first be exploited to fuel new power plants in the region. In fact, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has already more than tripled its 2015 target for installed gas-fired generating capacity. However, the region's gas potential seems to be so large that the only way to fully monetize it will be to develop export capacity. Turkey will consequently be the natural direction for gas exports from the region to Europe. In this sense, KRG Natural Resources Minister Ashti Hawrami declared in November 2011 that "If Nabucco or another Southern Corridor route does not materialize in time, we will consider an LNG plant in Ceyhan. We have the gas and we cannot wait for another five, 10 years to come up with plans" 79 . However, the relationship between Iraq's federal government in Baghdad and the KRG in Erbil, at odds over oil rights and export payments and the broader question of power-sharing, will complicate export efforts. Turkey's Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) estimates that gas imports from Iraq would start at 700 mcm/year in 2014, plateau at 3 bcm/year from 2017-31 and peak at 3.2 bcm/year in 2033 80 . Considering the importance of this relation, over the last years Turkey has worked to strengthen its alliance with the KRG 81 , embarking on a cooperation path that could be greatly beneficial for both parties.
(iii) Turkey in the new Eastern Mediterranean
The Eastern Mediterranean area is rapidly changing both in terms of energy and geopolitics. A recent exploratory activity in the offshore area between Israel and Cyprus has confirmed major natural gas finds that could radically change the energy outlook of the region. Israel's Natural Gas Authority estimates that these offshore gas resources could reach 1.3 tcm within the next few years 82 . A large natural gas field with estimated reserves at 453 bcm -the so-called "Leviathan field"-has been discovered in offshore Israel in late 2010. Successively in September 2011 another natural gas field with 140-226 bcm of estimated reserves 83 -the so-called "Aphrodite field"-has been discovered in offshore Cyprus. Turkey, which has constantly opposed the exploration for hydrocarbons in Cyprus until reunification talks between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) have been concluded, reacted to this drilling activity in offshore Cyprus by sending its own exploration vessel to the area and warning its navy and air force would keep constant watch 84 . Shortly after offshore drilling started, Turkey started geological surveys in offshore northern Cyprus. In November 2011, the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) signed a Petroleum Services and Production Sharing Contract with TRNC to progress exploration around Cyprus 85 and in April 2012 the exploratory drilling started 86 , further boosting the dispute over who is entitled to the Mediterranean island's potential hydrocarbon resources 87 . Turkey doesn't recognize Greek Cyprus as a sovereign country and insists that the Greek Cypriot search flouts the rights of Turkish Cypriots to any gas generated wealth while undermining negotiations to reunify the island 88 . Moreover, these natural gas discoveries come in the worst moment for Turkey-Israel relations, further complicating the geopolitical equilibrium of the area. Given the economic and strategic relevance of these issues, a period of turbulence is foreseeable in the area. However, among a number of uncertainties one thing is certain: the key-role that Turkey will play in either resolving or worsening the situation.
Conclusion: the urgency of a new EU-Turkey energy cooperation
This paper, presenting a wide range of issues related to the role of Turkey in the new Mediterranean, has tried to provide a comprehensive framework of understanding of the growing strategic relevance of Turkey for both the European Union and the overall Mediterranean region. In particular, after a necessary preliminary discussion of the role of Turkey in North Africa after the Arab Spring and its place among SEMCs in macroeconomic terms, the paper has focused on Turkey's future prospects as the regional natural gas hub. This should trigger a process of economic and social cooperation between the EU and Turkey and consequently within the overall Mediterranean region. The series of data elaborated in the paper has confirmed this assumption.
82 Enerjienergy (2012) , "Turkey's TPAO starts oil, natural gas search in northern Cyprus", April, 26. 88 
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In 2010 about 80% of EU gas imports derived from only three suppliers: Russian Federation, Norway and Algeria. This heavy dependence on such a few suppliers stimulated the European Commission to make the concept of diversification a cornerstone of its energy policy. In particular, the European Commission has formally launched in 2008 the concept of the Southern Gas Corridor, an initiative aimed to develop a natural gas transit corridor from Caspian and Middle Eastern gas-rich regions to Europe, in order to ease the dependency on the natural gas imported from the Russian Federation. This natural gas corridor is currently being designed, as there are a number of different infrastructure projects on the table. However, even if these various pipeline projects differ on their path, the transit throughout Turkey will be necessary in any case. Whatever will be the winning-project of the Southern gas corridor race, it is thus certain that it will contribute to the shift of the "center of gravity" of the regional gas transit from the north to the south of the Black Sea, allowing Turkey to become a key transit country in the future European gas market: a pivotal element in the European gas security of supply architecture.
Since 2002 Turkey has undertaken a new foreign policy that has progressively put aside deep-rooted ideological differences with its neighbours focusing on much more pragmatic economic and trade issues. In particular, natural gas has been the cornerstone of these new pragmatic relations between Turkey and Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Iraq. Moreover, Turkey has a role of crucial importance in the Eastern Mediterranean, an area rapidly changing both in terms of energy and geopolitics that has the potential to become a world-class natural gas province.
Considering all these factors, it becomes evident that over the next years Turkey will progressively become a crucial element both for the EU energy security and for the Mediterranean integration process. For this reason, the EU should develop a new energy cooperation scheme with Turkey. The first priority of such a scheme should be market integration, both for natural gas and electricity. The EU, through various initiatives such as INOGATE 89 , MEDREG 90 and Energy Community, has already undertaken some steps in this direction but without significant results. In particular, Turkey still maintain the status of "Observer country" within Energy Community, the institution established in 2005 with the objective of extending the acquis communautaire on electricity, gas, 89 INOGATE is a programme created by the EU in the 1990s in order to support energy infrastructure and development in the following countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Although initially mainly concerned with oil and gas pipelines, all the participating countries agreed that a closer cooperation on wider energy issues would be in their mutual interests. This dialogue was embodied in 2004 with the 'Baku Initiative', which identified four priority areas for energy policy cooperation: energy market convergence, enhancing energy security, sustainable energy development and investment attraction. See: http://www.inogate.org/. 90 MEDREG is the association of energy regulators for electricity and gas of the Mediterranean countries. The association is supported by the EU and is aimed at promoting clear, stable and harmonized legal and regulatory frameworks in the Mediterranean area. The main objectives of MEDREG are to facilitate the development of investments, infrastructures and interconnections, in order to support greater efficiency and integration of energy markets based on secure, safe, cost-effective and environmentally sustainable energy systems in the Mediterranean basin. MEDREG action will result in consolidation of the network of EuroMed energy regulators and implementation of minimum competences and organisational structure of Euro-Mediterranean Regulatory Authorities.
renewables, environment and security of supply to South East Europe and beyond 91 . The EU-Turkey cooperation on this point is still not adequate, and for this reason on February 9, 2012 the European Commission announced that EU and Turkish officials are to develop a joint roadmap by May 2012 for increasing cooperation in the energy sector. According to the Commission "both sides underlined the importance of opening the energy chapter (of the accession negotiation process). The closer cooperation on energy forms part of the comprehensive positive agenda, complementing and building on the accession process and not replacing it". This high-level political commitment, if positively translated into facts, could change the course of EU-Turkey energy cooperation and -consequently-serve as a stimulus for the overall EU-Turkey relations.
The second priority of a new EU-Turkey energy cooperation scheme should point to the development of renewable energy. There is an enormous renewable energy potential (particularly solar) among SEMCs, to which Turkey could greatly contribute in terms of technology transfer and manufacturing know-how. Turkey's involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean, an institutional framework that strongly supports large-scale renewable energy projects such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan and Desertec, offers a great opportunity for energy cooperation both between the EU and Turkey and within the overall Mediterranean region. Such large-scale renewable energy projects could greatly contribute to the economic development of the overall Mediterranean region, and also to its social and political stability.
In fact, as Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu once wrote: "There is always an intimate relationship between large-scale economic interaction and a stable political order" 92 .
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